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Abstract Feticide, the practice of terminating the life
of an otherwise viable fetus in utero, has become an
increasingly common practice in obstetric centres
around the globe, a concomitant of antenatal screen-
ing technologies. This paper examines this expanding
practice in light of the concept of human dignity.
Although it is assumed from the outset that even
viable human fetuses are not persons and as such do
not enjoy full membership in the moral community, it
is argued that the fact that these are nevertheless
human fetuses affords them prima facie moral status.
Thus even those who accept a liberal position with
regard to therapeutic abortion, should be concerned
about these more recent developments. Indeed, how
we treat viable human fetuses has implications for our
prospective treatment of other human non-persons
and could undermine the common human dignity we
all share.
Keywords Human dignity . Feticide . Therapeutic
abortion . Antenatal screening . Personhood .Moral
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The life of a single human organism demands
respect and protection, then, no matter in what
form or shape, because of the complex creative
investment it represents and because of our
wonder at the divine or evolutionary processes
that produce new lives from old ones, at the
processes of nation and community and language
through which a human being will come to
absorb and continue hundreds of generations of
cultures and forms of life and value, and, finally,
when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the
process of internal personal creation and judg-
ment by which a person will make and remake
himself, a mysterious, inescapable process in
which we each participate, and which is there-
fore the most powerful and inevitable source of
empathy and communion we have with every
other creature who faces the same frightening
challenge. The horror we feel in the willful
destruction of a human life reflects our shared
inarticulate sense of the intrinsic importance of
each of these dimensions of investment.
Ronald Dworkin (1993, 84)
Science and technology drive clinical practice.
Given the rapidity of these advances, at times new
practices evolve without the benefit of close public
scrutiny. The advent of diagnostic imaging and
genetic testing, for example, spawned the entirely
new field of genetic counseling as these technologies
made it possible to predict the risk of disease or
Bioethical Inquiry (2010) 7:353–364
DOI 10.1007/s11673-010-9257-z
D. Pullman (*)
Faculty of Medicine, Memorial University,
St. John’s, NL A1B 3V6, Canada
e-mail: dpullman@mun.ca
disability of the developing fetus. Prospective parents
were thus presented with the option of terminating a
previously wanted pregnancy. At times, however, the
process required to confirm a suspected diagnosis
results in a decision to terminate later in the gestational
process. Not only does this present additional obstetrical
challenges, but it raises the possibility of a live birth. In
order to forestall this latter eventuality, feticide has
become an increasingly common practice in obstetrical
centers around the globe, a concomitant of previously
accepted prenatal screening practices (Bijma et al. 2007;
Graham et al. 2008; 2009; Dommergues et al. 2003;
Chen et al. 2009).
For more than a decade one particularly controversial
means of feticide has been the subject of intense debate
in the United States. That practice, known colloquially
as “partial birth abortion” and described somewhat less
emotively in medical parlance as “dilation and extrac-
tion” (D&X), has reinvigorated the therapeutic abortion
debate in that country (Rovner 2006). The Bush
administration finally pushed through the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act in 2003 to make D&X illegal. That
legislation subsequently withstood a constitutional
challenge when it was upheld by the US Supreme
Court in 2007. Critics of both the initial legislation and
the Supreme Court’s decision have objected to the
“overtly political discourse” that invokes “respect for
the dignity of human life” and which claims that the
act of abortion has the power to “devalue” human life
(Gostin 2007, 1563).
Characterizing the concept of human dignity as a
political notion rather than as a fundamental moral
concept has become somewhat commonplace in
recent years. Some have dismissed human dignity
entirely as a morally vacuous notion (Macklin 2003).
Others complain that the term has been co-opted by
special interest groups to advance their own agendas.
Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) have been partic-
ularly articulate in this regard, referring pejoratively
to the “dignitarian alliance” that invokes dignity as a
kind of moral trump card that brings all discussion on
sensitive ethical matters to an end (Brownsword 2003,
425). Be that as it may, the concept of human dignity
continues to play a foundational role in many of our
most critical international declarations, conventions,
and consensus statements (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 1948; President’s Council 2002). Thus
it behooves us to think carefully about the normative
force this concept might continue to exert.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
practice of feticide in light of the concept of human
dignity. Although it isn’t possible to deal with the
question of feticide without touching on some of the
broader ethical concerns associated with therapeutic
abortion in general, the ethics of selective termination,
and the concerns raised by advocates for the disabled
(Wasserman et al. 2005), our focus here will be more
narrowly on feticide, the intentional killing of
otherwise viable fetuses. The discussion to follow
begins by reflecting upon the broader moral and legal
frameworks in which the practice of feticide has
evolved. Most countries that permit (or do not restrict)
the use of feticide are signatories to or otherwise
recognize various international conventions that up-
hold the inherent dignity of all members of the human
family, and predicate a regime of rights based on this
foundational concept. While virtually all countries
provide some level of legal protection to the newborn
infant, most are ambiguous with regard to the moral
and legal status of the viable fetus. It is this ambiguity
that permits the termination of otherwise viable
fetuses on the one hand, but which often results in
aggressive intervention with premature newborns on
the other (Gross 1999, 2002).
Historically, much of the debate regarding thera-
peutic abortion has revolved around the question of
fetal personhood (Gross 1999). For present purposes
we will bracket that particularly intractable aspect of
the debate in order to focus on the concept of dignity.
For the sake of argument we will suppose that fetuses
are not persons in any robust sense at any stage of
gestation (Warren 1973). However, while not persons
per se they are nevertheless human fetuses. Part of
our task is to determine what if any status human non-
persons might have within a moral community that
claims to recognize fundamental human worth, and
what if any protections otherwise viable human
fetuses might thus be afforded under the banner of
human dignity. The aim is to develop a moral
perspective that invokes a notion of human dignity
that captures broad moral intuitions, without suc-
cumbing to political sloganeering (Caulfield and
Brownsword 2006, 76).
The argument presented here is intended to
advance our understanding of human dignity while
casting some light on the question of feticide in
particular and our treatment of human non-persons
more generally. The paper unfolds in three stages.
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First, I outline some of the changes in pre-natal
screening and related genetic technologies that have
led to the expanding practice of late terminations of
otherwise viable pregnancies in many jurisdictions
around the globe. Second, I examine some competing
conceptions of human dignity and argue for a
preferred model that overcomes some of the short-
comings of the alternative view while situating the
question of feticide within a broad moral framework.
The preferred understanding of human dignity is then
invoked in the later part of the paper to inform our
understanding of the ethics of feticide.
Medicine, Morality and the Law
By the 1990s the obstetric ultrasound was well
entrenched as a standard of care, supplemented
increasingly by genetic services and biochemical
screening. As more anomalous fetuses were identi-
fied, later-term abortions became more frequent. It is
easy to lose sight of how the emergence of these
clinical practices essentially changed the terms of
reference of the abortion debate.
Before the wide availability of antenatal screening
technologies, the abortion issue was framed narrowly
in terms of individual autonomy and a woman’s right
to choose. The focus was squarely on the woman and
only incidentally on the fetus. It didn’t matter whether
she was pregnant due to failed contraception, care-
lessness, or had simply changed her mind; the fact
that she did not want a baby (that is, any baby) at this
point in her life was sufficient to justify her decision
to terminate the pregnancy. Inasmuch as a woman is
generally aware that she is pregnant relatively early in
the gestation period, the process of termination is
fairly straightforward and is usually carried out well
before the point of viability. Indeed the vast majority
of terminations fall squarely into this category. Hence
most jurisdictions eventually recognized a woman’s
autonomy rights in this regard, and early term
abortion services became widely available.1
With the advent of prenatal screening the terms of
reference of the abortion debate changed. Now the
decision to abort was often made not by a woman
who did not want to be pregnant, but by one who had
decided to become pregnant and who could have
terminated her pregnancy earlier. Her late decision to
terminate was based on information gained through
prenatal testing. Given the woman’s initial desire to
have a baby, but her later decision not to have this
baby, the focus now shifts to the fetus she has decided
to abort. When this shift occurs the question is no
longer simply about a woman’s reproductive freedom,
but rather about the determination of legitimate
grounds for terminating the lives of particular, often
viable, fetuses. No longer can this be characterized
simply as an individual woman’s autonomous right to
choose, or as a medical matter to be decided between
a woman and her physician. As will be argued
presently, what society allows or accepts in this
regard has implications for the dignity in which we
all have a stake.
To date, the most thorough comparative analysis of
international practices with regard to feticide has been
conducted by Michael Gross (1999, 2002). Writing in
1999 Gross observed: “the general issue of a woman’s
right to an abortion, at least in Western democracies,
is largely settled. In its place, the question of late-term
abortions begins to assume a prominence only
recently attributed to abortion itself” (1999, 449).
Gross is only partially right. While the question of
abortion does not figure as prominently in public
moral discourse, the issue of feticide has not replaced
it as a general public concern. Instead, 10 years on
from when Gross made his initial observations the
practice of feticide is expanding without rekindling
the broad debate he had anticipated. Several distinct
but related reasons can be adduced for this, including
moral conflation, medical hegemony, and moral
particularism.
Moral conflation involves a failure to distinguish
distinct moral issues, thus confusing one with the
other. Once Western democracies had more or less
settled the question of abortion in favor of the
woman’s right to choose, the question of the moral
status of the fetus faded into the background.
Although various courts have at times acknowledged
that not every regulation of termination of pregnancy
constitutes an interference with private life (Wicks et
al. 2004), and that the fetus has interests that should
1 While the woman’s right to choose was central to most of the
national public debates, not all jurisdictions emphasize auton-
omy rights to the same degree in their legislative responses. In
England, for example, abortion law is not concerned primarily
about the woman’s autonomy and is not rights-based, although
this has been a point of some controversy (Scott 203).
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be recognized (Kent 2005, 166; Gross 2002, 204),
legislatures and the courts have either found it
difficult or have been reluctant to regulate late
terminations. As long as the courts recognize a
woman’s right to abortion, but fail to account for the
manner in which prenatal screening has changed the
terms of reference of the debate, the question of the
moral status of the late-term fetus will continue to be
conflated with that of a woman’s reproductive liberty.
This is borne out, for example, by the expanding case
law on “wrongful birth” in which the right to abort a
fetus has been extended to include the right to access
information in order to determine whether to abort
this fetus (Scott 2003).
When legislatures and the courts fail to recognize
the interests of the late term fetus, medical profes-
sionals are left to their own devices to sort out an
appropriate standard of care. As the practice of
feticide expanded throughout the 1990s, medical
practitioners struggled to come to grips with whether
they served one patient or two when caring for a
pregnant woman. Some focused almost exclusively
on the woman as patient and advocated for the use of
feticide as a means to avoid potential legal perils
associated with a live birth, to reduce medical risks,
and to limit psychological harm (Fletcher et al. 1992).
Others argued that the fetus is a patient from the point
of viability and advocated for severe limitations on
late term abortions (Chervenak et al. 1995).
Medical hegemony refers both to the manner in
which evolving standards of practice can mask or
circumvent the moral issues at hand, and how medicine
can in turn assume that the issues are primarily clinical.
Diagnostic imaging and prenatal screening technologies
are now the standard of care in medicine. Even at this
late date, however, many patients fail to appreciate the
moral implications that the use of these technologies can
entail. One recent European study observes: “Most
women consider ultrasound examinations as an integral
part of antenatal care. However, frequently, women lack
information about the purpose of ultrasound examina-
tions and its technical limitations. As a result, women
are often unprepared for adverse findings” (Bijma et al.
2007). Another study confirms that clinical technique
has effectively supplanted moral debate: “Within the
medical literature, attention tends to focus on the
progressive development of technique by which
feticide can be achieved. This technical literature says
little about the complexities of feticide within its social
context. The term feticide appears to be used as if it
were unproblematic, a neutral term that describes a
clinical procedure” (Graham et al. 2008, 291).
Feticide is now firmly entrenched as a standard of
medical practice. Thus the International Federation of
Gynecology and Obstetrics recommends that “Termi-
nation of pregnancy following prenatal diagnosis after
22 weeks must be preceded by a feticide” (FIGO 2008,
98). In jurisdictions where the practice is somewhat
restricted, as, for example, in parts of Australia and
under the recent ban on partial birth abortion in the US,
commentators complain that such restrictions limit
patient access to procedures that are recognized in the
profession, while curtailing practitioner’s freedom to
exercise clinical judgment (De Crepigny and Savulescu
2008; Gostin 2007).
Moral conflation and medical hegemony describe
two phenomena that have facilitated the expansion of
feticide in recent years. However, while the use of
feticide has expanded generally, the details of this
expansion in terms of the extent to which it is used,
the means by which it is regulated, if at all, and so
forth, have varied across jurisdictions. Moral partic-
ularism describes the manner in which the practice of
feticide has unfolded within specific national and
cultural contexts, and the idiosyncratic policies and
practices that have sprung up around it. Here I draw
on Gross’s (1999, 2002) excellent work to describe
something of this phenomenon.
Gross is interested in the practice of feticide and
selective non-treatment of newborns (neonanticide).
He is puzzled by the fact that nations that share
similar underlying political cultures have not adopted
similar policies. He notes: “The same moderately
malformed 25 week old fetus might be aborted in
Israel, delivered but not necessarily resuscitated in
Denmark, resuscitated but not always treated aggres-
sively in the UK, and treated aggressively in the US”
(2002, 203).
On the one hand the development of disparate
policies is understandable. Although Western democ-
racies share similar political cultures these similarities
exist at only the most general level. Each nation has
its own unique history, geography, and economy, is
influenced by different religious and cultural norms,
and has particular means by which to allocate health
care resources. Hence the question of abortion in
general and feticide in particular has played out
within each jurisdiction’s particular milieu. However,
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while this may serve as an explanation for how
particular policies can vary, it is not a justification for
vast differences when the practice in question
involves the termination of an otherwise viable
human life. Thus Gross wonders whether nations
with similar political cultures shouldn’t adopt similar
policies on such a fundamental issue: “Either these
countries do not share the same norms, or the norms
are sufficiently elastic to permit wildly diverse policy,
or some policy is just plain wrong” (2002, 204).
Although Gross does not distinguish between
values and norms, that distinction is important here.
In fact, it would be more accurate to say that in spite
of different norms Western polities share some
fundamental values that have been captured histori-
cally in the notion of dignity. This last serves as a
fitting segue into a discussion of human dignity and
how this fundamental moral notion bears on the
practice of feticide. Anticipating what lies ahead, we
will respond to Gross’s tripartite disjunction as
follows: (1) irrespective of the particularities of local
custom and practice, Western democracies do indeed
share some basic fundamental values which are
captured in the notion of human dignity; (2) while
the notion of dignity is sufficiently elastic to permit
some variation in policy, it is not so elastic as to
permit wildly diverse policies on the issue of feticide;
and (3) some current policy with regard to feticide is
indeed just plain wrong.
Understanding Human Dignity
Forty years ago the late Herbert Spiegelberg contributed
to a volume of essays on the subject of human dignity.
He observed (1970, 62): “Human dignity seems to be
one of the few common values in our world of
philosophical pluralism … The main hurdle at the
moment is that there is not enough clarity about the
meaning of human dignity. To provide it is the
responsibility of all philosophers.” Leon Kass, writing
more than three decades later, echoes Spiegelberg’s
general observation: “Human dignity is ... a useful
notion, perhaps even the right one ... Yet if it is to be
more than an empty slogan, we need to articulate its
meaning” (2002, 14–15).
Over the past two decades I have made several
contributions to the dignity literature in an attempt to
articulate its meaning. Some of that work is more
theoretical in nature (Pullman 2002a, b, 2006), while
other pieces address particular health ethics issues
(Pullman 1996, 1999, 2004a). While I will not
rehearse the details of those various discussions here,
it will be necessary to provide a general outline of the
manner in which I articulate my understanding of
dignity in order to inform our discussion of feticide.
Before doing so, however, I want to outline an
alternate understanding of human dignity promulgat-
ed by Derek Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword
(2001). I focus on their work for three reasons: (1)
Beyleveld and Brownsword provide the most system-
atic and comprehensive explication of the subject to
date; (2) my own explication of human dignity runs
contrary to their preferred interpretation at several
points, particularly with regard to human non-
persons; and, finally (3) the notion of dignity
Beyleveld and Brownsword prefer provides question-
able direction on the issue of feticide.
Beyleveld and Brownsword distinguish two rival
conceptions of human dignity, which they term
dignity as empowerment and dignity as constraint
(2001, 9ff). Dignity as empowerment is their pre-
ferred view, but they worry that dignity as constraint
is making inroads in contemporary bioethics and
biolaw. In their view dignity as constraint is a recent
conception instantiated in broad international state-
ments such as the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, and the Universal Declaration of the
Human Genome and Human Rights. The hallmark of
this notion is that it invokes dignity to constrain free
choice. Dignity as constraint is invoked, for example,
to deny parents the opportunity to sex select their
children or to use genetic technologies to create
“designer children,” to prohibit agents from partici-
pating in commerce of the human body, from cloning
human cells, to curtail active euthanasia, and so forth
(2001, 4). On this view human dignity constrains by
propounding some conception of a collective good
that represents society’s vision of the kind of
community it wants to be, and by suggesting it is as
wrong to compromise one’s own dignity as it is to
compromise the dignity of others (2001, 11).
Beyleveld and Brownsword are particularly
concerned about the manner in which recent human
rights instruments foreground human dignity and then
use it to limit free choice. They maintain that earlier
instruments, such as those developed immediately
after the Second World War, did not afford human
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dignity such a substantive role. Instead human dignity
remained in the background to serve as a basis for equal
respect and to ground human rights (2001, 12–13).
Human rights, in their preferred view, are enjoyed by
human agents who alone have the capacity to act upon
or waive those rights (2001, 118). However, more
recent instruments such as the European Convention
on Human Rights have expanded the role of dignity
and have extended its reach to cover not just full
human agents, but human non-agents and partial
agents such as embryos and fetuses as well.
Dignity as constraint thus runs headlong into
liberal notions of autonomy that Beyleveld and
Brownsword are wont to defend. “[I]f embryonic
and foetal life is protected under the cover of
respect for human dignity (in its new extended
sense),” they note, “then the autonomous choices of
researchers (for example, to create, test, manipulate,
and store embryos) and of women (to terminate
pregnancies) must be measured for their legitimacy
against not only the general regime of human
rights, but also against the special dignity-based
regime protecting such early human life” (2001,
32–33). Now while some may not be overly
concerned that the autonomous choices of researchers
and the decisions of women with regard to the
disposition of otherwise viable fetuses should be open
to some level of public scrutiny, Beyleveld and Brown-
sword find this troubling. Dignity as constraint, they
complain, curtails individual freedom by propounding a
subjective and nebulous conception of a collective
good.
Dignity as empowerment is, in their view, the more
traditional conception that serves as the basis for the
regime of individual human rights that developed in
the post-World War Two era. On this reading intrinsic
human dignity plays something of a formal role in
that it serves as “the background justification for the
recognition of human rights and as the source of the
fundamental freedoms to which all humans (qua
human) are entitled” (2001, 11). But once dignity as
empowerment establishes the basis of human rights it
stands back and leaves the heavy normative work to
the notions of agency and rights. Thus Beyleveld and
Brownsword devote most of their effort to an
explication of the notion of agency: “If (as we hold)
the essence of the dignity of agents resides in their
capacity to choose, to set their own ends, then we
respect that dignity by creating the conditions and
opportunities for choice and recognizing agents as
sources of informed choice” (2001, 5).
The notion of agency and generic rights Beyleveld
and Brownsword develop draws heavily on the work
of Alan Gewirth (1978, 1982). It is neither possible
nor necessary to describe Gewirth’s contribution in
any detail here. For our current purposes, however, it
is important to note how their Gewirthian rendering
results in a complete metamorphosis of the notion of
human dignity, effectively turning it on its head. That
is, although they begin by recognizing the intrinsic
dignity of humanity as the basis of human rights
(2001, 11), by the time they have constructed their
Gewirthian notion of agency and tied it to a
conception of generic rights, dignity becomes contin-
gent on agency: “In Gewirthian theory beings have
dignity if and only if they are agents. All agents are,
therefore, equal in their dignity and possess equal
generic rights” (2001, 148). Elsewhere they state: “ ...
we are committed to the view that agency is the
ground of human dignity” (2001, 157).
Now all of this has implications for the moral
standing of human non-persons/non-agents in general,
and for how we think about feticide in particular. For
if agency is the ground of human dignity, and if
having the generic capacities of agency is necessary
for having generic rights, then partial agents or non-
agents cannot have any rights at all: “Having the
generic capacities of agency to the degree needed to
be an agent is not only necessary (and sufficient) to
have the generic rights in full ... it is necessary to have
any generic rights at all. This is because, as derived,
the generic rights are rights under the will conception
of rights ... Thus, partial agents cannot have any
generic rights” (2001, 118 their emphasis).
Elsewhere Beyleveld and Brownsword acknowledge
that human rights instruments do occasionally grant
rights to “very young children, foetuses, the dead, and
members of the human biological species,” but they
consider such extensions to be in some sense derivative
and secondary to the status of full agents (2001, 81).
Indeed, given their insistence that full agency is both
necessary for rights and serves as the ground of human
dignity, it seems that such secondary and derivative
extensions of rights to non-agents (such as fetuses)
would effectively weaken the notion of dignity tied to
full agency. Under dignity as empowerment then a
women as full agent has dignity, while her fetus as a
non-agent has none. To extend some derivative or
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secondary notion of agency to the fetus by invoking
some notion of dignity then, would be to invoke
“dignity as constraint” in order to curtail “dignity as
empowerment.” Thus any attempt to limit the free
choices of women to do as they please vis-à-vis
feticide, would, on their view, be an offence to human
dignity.
In order to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of
Beyleveld’s and Brownsword’s conception of dignity,
and the concomitant notions of agency and rights they
espouse, I turn now to sketch an alternative interpre-
tation of dignity which, as noted previously, I have
developed in various contexts over the past number of
years. Like Beyleveld and Brownsword I begin by
noting that there are different conceptions of human
dignity extant that are invoked variously in moral
discourse. I recognize as well that historically the
notion of dignity conveys the idea that human beings
are intrinsically valuable and are thus worthy of
respect. Beyond these basic observations, however,
my understanding of human dignity diverges signif-
icantly from their account. In particular, as it relates to
the issue of feticide, my understanding extends the
notion of dignity to include human fetuses, and it
includes them not only secondarily or derivatively but
simply by virtue of the fact that they are, after all
“human” fetuses. On this view responding to the
inherent dignity of fetuses and other human non-
persons does not weaken the dignity claims that full
persons (or agents) enjoy; rather it serves to express,
enhance and preserve that dignity. However, to
recognize that fetuses have dignity does not entail
that they are entitled to the full measure of rights
afforded full human agents, but only that insofar as
they are human they deserve moral consideration.
How is this so?
My account begins by distinguishing a universal,
basic, ascriptive conception of human dignity, from
various particular, personal, and expressivist accounts.
The former notion, which I refer to simply as “basic
dignity,” ascribes worth to human beings simply on
the basis of being human. When used in this
ascriptive sense we mean to convey the idea that all
human entities have basic moral worth irrespective of
any contingent historical, traditional, or cultural
circumstance. One does nothing to earn basic dignity
and one can do nothing to lose it. Just being human
invests one with this basic moral worth irrespective of
rank or station. It is this conception that is in view, for
example, when we refer to the inviolability of human
dignity, to the intrinsic moral worth of all humanity,
and when we speak of inalienable human rights
founded upon and expressive of dignity. The essence
of this conception is not that people have a right to be
treated with dignity, but rather that people have rights
because they have dignity. Apropos of the current
discussion, and pace Beyleveld and Brownsword,
basic dignity is not contingent on agency. Any human
entity enjoys a prima facie claim to moral consider-
ation simply by virtue of being human.2
This basic, universal notion is distinct from various
particular expressions. I collect the latter together
under the rubric “personal dignity.” Here “personal”
should not be confused with “individual.” Rather the
intent is to capture the fact that the self is a socially
constructed entity. Personal dignity is thus tied to
notions of self-respect and self-esteem, and is inti-
mately related to the complex social and psycholog-
ical processes involved in self formation and self
expression. As such, perspectives on personal dignity
will vary with historical, cultural and traditional
experiences and values, as individuals and communi-
ties engage in the ongoing process of defining who
they are and what they want to become. While some
of these journeys of self formation and self expression
might tend toward more individualistic conceptions,
others may reflect broader community inputs and a
broader corporate sense of self. Thus it is personal
dignity that is in view when we say that people have a
right to be treated with dignity, meaning we should
respect who they are and who they are striving to
become as persons.
Given this understanding it is clear that there will
always be a variety of expressions of personal dignity
extant, and at times some expressions might conflict.
2 I am aware that this understanding of dignity is subject to a
charge of speciesism, that is, that it privileges the human
species over other species. I acknowledge this charge but
remain unconvinced of its merit. In general my response
revolves around the notion of agency, and the distinction
between moral agents and moral subjects. Human beings alone
are capable of moral agency (i.e. incurring duties and
obligations), although human non-persons and non-human
animals are moral subjects (i.e. are deserving of moral
consideration). Thus, rather than serving to ground moral
rights, as Beyleveld and Brownsword claim, moral agency is
the basis of moral obligation. So while humans have moral
obligations to other species, we can expect no such consider-
ation from them. For a somewhat fuller response see Pullman
2004b.
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How such conflicts should be resolved is a long-
standing problem in social political philosophy and
we cannot engage further in that discussion here. For
present purposes we need note only that both “dignity
as constraint” and “dignity as empowerment,” as
described by Beyleveld and Brownsword, can, on this
reading, be characterized as alternative understand-
ings of “personal dignity.” That is, each conception
advances a particular understanding of what it is to
live a dignified existence, the former maintaining a
self understanding that draws upon wider communi-
tarian values, and the latter maintaining that individ-
ualistic conceptions of personal dignity should hold
sway.
As important as the notion of personal dignity is to
our understanding of the variety of ways in which
dignity is expressed both in community values and
individual choices, it is basic dignity that grounds these
various expressivist accounts. That is, the idea that
humanity has intrinsic worth has functioned historically
as a kind of logical primitive in moral discourse. Kant
captures this general notion most famously in the
Categorical Imperative, and Habermas draws upon it
as well when he alludes to “a prior ethical self-
understanding of the species, which is shared by all
moral persons”(2003, 40). Samuel Fleischaker (1994,
17) sums it up this way: “It is not merely out of a desire
to spread our own way of life that we demand universal
acknowledgment of a certain fundamental dignity in all
human beings. We cannot avoid believing that those
who do not recognize human dignity are wrong about
something; that they have failed to recognize some-
thing about the very nature of morality.” Indeed it is
this notion that Beyleveld and Brownsword have in
mind when they speak of intrinsic dignity “that acts as
the background justification for the recognition of
human rights and as the source of the fundamental
freedoms to which all humans (qua human) are
entitled” (2001, 11).
Basic dignity and personal dignity are complemen-
tary notions. Both are essential to a proper under-
standing of the full concept of dignity. How we
characterize the relationship between the two con-
ceptions is critical both to a proper appreciation for
how the notion of human dignity functions in moral
discourse in general, and for how appeals to dignity
impact on particular ethical problems. It is also
important to an understanding of how human non-
persons who are not self-consciously aware and thus
cannot have a sense of self or a notion of personal
dignity (individual, communal or otherwise), might
nevertheless deserve moral consideration under the
auspices of basic dignity.
Elsewhere I have characterized the dynamic rela-
tionship between basic and personal dignity in terms
of ethical and aesthetical values (Pullman 2002a), and
have mapped it to the universalism/particularism
distinction (Pullman 2002b). For our purposes here
we can think of the relationship in terms of form and
content. Basic dignity thus acts as a formal meaning
constraint on moral discourse in the broad sense, and
particularist expressions of what it is to have a
meaningful and dignified existence provide the
content. Again, I have developed the idea that basic
dignity functions as a meaning constraint on moral
discourse elsewhere (Pullman 2004a) and will not
reiterate that detail here. The key point is that moral
language presupposes a notion of basic human dignity
that requires that human beings are granted prima
facie moral standing. As a formal epistemic constraint
basic dignity functions to set the epistemic boundary
on what passes as meaningful moral discourse. Thus
it functions primarily as an epistemic constraint, and
only incidentally (although necessarily) as a moral
constraint. The content of the full conception of
dignity is provided then by particularist understand-
ings of what it means to live a dignified life. Both
conceptions are necessary to a full understanding of
human dignity. To paraphrase Kant’s famous apho-
rism: basic dignity without personal dignity is empty;
personal dignity without basic dignity is blind.
Feticide and the Erosion of Dignity
We return finally to the issue of feticide, and how the
understanding of dignity presented here might inform
that discussion. To begin, I want to return to the
notion of dignity as empowerment as advanced by
Beyleveld and Brownsword. Earlier it was noted that
given their explication, fetuses lack agency and would
ipso facto lack dignity. Thus fetuses, as such, have no
claim to the generic rights. Dignity as empowerment
then says nothing about the issue of feticide other
than that each woman as a full agent is free to choose
feticide or not depending on her own view of the
good life. Fetuses as such are outside of the moral
community. This, I take it, is the plain reading of their
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position. It is interesting then that these authors return
to the issue of the moral status of embryos and
fetuses, and attempt to open a door by which to grant
them moral status after all. In order to do so they
invoke “precautionary reasoning” that “requires
agents to recognize duties to the unborn in proportion
to the degree to which the unborn display character-
istics associated with the ability to display agency”
(2001, 157–8).
Now on the one hand it is not surprising that
Beyleveld and Brownsword want to find a way to
shoehorn human non-persons/non-agents back into
the moral community. Any conception of morality
that denies any measure of moral standing whatsoever
to human non-agents would border on moral non-
sense. As such it would violate the epistemic
constraint supplied by the notion of basic dignity
outlined above. Thus Beyleveld and Brownsword are
to be commended on this score. On the other hand,
their attempt to argue that embryos and fetuses might
display characteristics associated with agency, and
hence should be afforded moral consideration on this
basis, is weak at best; it flies in the face of the
Gewirthian notions of agency and generic rights they
expound so forcefully elsewhere. So while we can
agree that “it is on account of considerations of
dignity that duties to the embryo arise,” and that “not
to take account of these considerations is to act in
violation of human dignity,” (2001, 158) their
explication of the nature of dignity tied to agency
simply doesn’t support this application.
The problem with dignity as empowerment tied to
a strong notion of agency is that it results in a very
restricted conception of dignity. Many human non-
agents/non-persons that most would agree should
have some measure of moral standing are excluded.
While opinions may vary with regard to the status of
embryos and early stage fetuses, moral intuitions
begin to converge around viable fetuses, newborns,
very young children, the mentally challenged, those
suffering from advanced dementia, and so forth.
However, all of these fall beyond the pale of morality
and dignity tied to agency in the strict Gewirthian
sense advanced by Beyleveld and Brownsword. This
is because “the generic rights are rights under the will
conception of rights ... Thus, partial agents cannot
have any generic rights” (2001, 118).
On the alternate view of basic dignity as epistemic
constraint, human fetuses have prima facie moral
standing simply by virtue of being human. The same
holds for other human non-persons/non-agents in-
cluding human gametes, human embryos, those who
suffer from advanced dementia and have thus lost the
capacity for agency, and so forth. Here the dignity
possessed by these human entities is based on their
biological connection to the rest of the human species.
However, pace Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001,
166), it does not follow that every human biological
specimen must thus be afforded equal moral worth.
As an epistemic constraint basic dignity requires only
that human entities be given prima facie moral
consideration. How we dispose over them is another
matter. For the time being we need acknowledge only
that the fact that these are human entities is not
inconsequential.
While dignity as empowerment results in a very
restricted conception of dignity, basic dignity as
epistemic constraint could be charged with suffering
from the opposite problem. That is, by granting some
measure of moral status to all human specimens we
risk diluting the notion of dignity completely. Here
again, however, we must reiterate that basic dignity
functions primarily as a meaning constraint that
shapes the nature of moral discourse in the broad
sense. Personal dignity then provides the content
through the individual and corporate projects in which
we engage and by which we come to understand and
express the kinds of people we are and want to become.
Basic dignity constrains this self-understanding by
ensuring that we consider carefully how our treatment
of any human entity affects the broad moral discourse
that we share as a moral community. Thus moral
discourse constrained by basic dignity acknowledges
that not every human entity is worthy of full moral
consideration; human tissues are clearly not equivalent
to human persons. Nevertheless, the fact that it is human
tissue as opposed to non-human animal or plant tissue,
for example, gives it prima facie moral significance.
On occasion I’ve employed a balloon analogy to
illustrate how basic dignity serves as an epistemic
constraint on moral discourse, and to capture the
dynamic relationship between basic and personal
dignity (Pullman 2002b, 2004a) On this analogy the
skin of the balloon represents basic dignity, while the
contents represent various particularist expressions.
Inasmuch as the skin of a balloon is elastic, this
epistemic constraint can stretch to accommodate a
variety of particularist understandings of what it
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means to live a dignified life. As such it can accommo-
date conceptions of the human good that use human
tissues for experimentation, permit the termination of
early term fetuses, and perhaps even consider circum-
stances in which beneficent euthanasia of otherwise
viable human beings might be permissible. However,
each of these practices exerts some degree of pressure
on the basic epistemic constraint, stretching it in the
process. As such we must consider carefully any
practices that might stretch or erode that basic constraint
to the point that we lose that common understanding of
morality tied to a notion of dignity that has in one way or
another shaped much of our moral understanding of the
kinds of people we are and can be.
We return now to Gross’s (2002) consternation as
to why countries that share similar political cultures
can diverge so much in terms of policy and practice
on the issue of feticide. He speculates that either these
cultures do not share similar values/norms after all, or
that the basic values they do share are sufficiently
elastic to accommodate wide variation in practice, or
that some policies are just wrong. In light of the full
concept of human dignity outlined here, we can now
respond as follows. All moral communities share a
common value in the notion of basic human dignity
that ascribes basic moral worth to all humanity. The
nature of morality is such that this notion functions as
an epistemic constraint on all moral discourse. At the
same time the notion of basic dignity is sufficiently
elastic to allow for some variation in policy and
practice between particular moral communities, and
with regard to the treatment of particular human
entities within those communities. This policy and
practice manifests itself in the variety of community
and individual self-understandings and expressions of
personal dignity that exist in all liberal democratic
societies. However, this elasticity is not without
limits. Any community that has lost the moral
vocabulary by which to restrain certain human
behaviors with regard to how its members dispose
over human non-persons in general, and, given our
focus here, over the terminations of viable human
fetuses in particular, risks drifting into moral non-
sense. Put otherwise, some liberal policy with regard
to the issue of feticide is just wrong. Indeed, one
practical policy outcome of the moral arguments
advanced here would be that viable fetuses (irrespec-
tive of potential anomalies) should enjoy the same
legal protections as newborn infants.
This discussion has not addressed the circumstances
under which feticide might be permissible. Clearly risks
to the mother’s health must be considered, although
recent literature suggests that when the door is opened to
include both the physical and emotional wellbeing of the
mother as determined within the context of other
“medical decisions,” the ability to restrict the practice
of feticide is compromised significantly (Wicks et al.
2004, 287). There has been little research conducted to
date on the long-term emotional effects for women who
have elected late-term abortions (Graham et al. 2008;
Fisher 2008). Other issues include the concerns raised
by disability rights advocates and those related to the
potential pain and suffering of anomalous newborns.3
All of these concerns are related, and how we respond
to each has implications for how we will think about
our dignity as human beings in the future.
Conclusion
This paper opens with a quotation from Ronald
Dworkin that stresses the importance of thinking
seriously about our treatment of all human existence. I
close now with a more recent quotation from Leon
Kass. He writes (2002, 197):
In the 35 years since I began thinking about
these matters, our society has overcome long-
standing taboos and aversions to accept test-
tube fertilization, commercial sperm banking,
surrogate motherhood, abortion on demand,
exploitation of fetal tissue, creation of human
embryos solely for experimentation, patenting
of living human tissue, gender-change surgery,
liposuction and body shops, the widespread
shuttling of human parts, assisted suicide prac-
ticed by doctors, and the deliberate generation
of human beings to serve as transplant donors—
not to mention massive changes in the culture
regarding shame, privacy and exposure.
3 The question of suffering must be considered as well, whether
of potential children who might suffer from debilitating or fatal
illnesses, or of potential parents who might be burdened with
their care. For present purposes suffice it to say that how a
moral community responds in the face of human suffering
provides opportunities to express and enhance human dignity.
Thus simply to eliminate potential suffering through techno-
logical means could serve to undermine human dignity (see
Pullman 2002a).
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Each of these practices has been met with some
opposition, but in the end, each has achieved a level
of accommodation in contemporary society. The full
conception of dignity outlined here allows for such
accommodation. But it suggests, as well, that each
accommodation puts additional strain on the basic
epistemic notion that constrains our moral discourse.
The arguments we accept in order to justify each new
practice forestalls counter-arguments that might be
used to constrain them. In the process the notion of
dignity that anchors our recognition of fundamental
human rights suffers some erosion.
The issue of feticide concerns our treatment of
human non-persons. At a time when we are acquiring
an increasingly fine-grained ability to predict the
potential health status and perhaps even the future social
status of individual fetuses, we must think carefully
about the rationales we use to justify such terminations.
Arguments we accept now to justify the treatment of
these human non-persons will have future implications
for our treatment of other human non-persons as well.
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